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Abstract: 
Using a large panel of 6946 French manufacturing firms, this paper investigates the effect 
of sales, of the cost of capital and of liquidity constraint variables (cash flow or cash 
stock) on the stock of capital from 1990 to 1999. The user cost elasticity is at the most 
0.26 in absolute terms for all the firms of the sample. Three groups of firms representing 
around 20 per cent of the sample (firms facing a high risk of bankruptcy, firms belonging 
to the capital goods sector, firms making extensive use of trade credit) are more sensitive 
to cash flow. Risky firms are less sensitive to sales, when cash stock replaces cash flow. 
Simulations following shocks of interest rate (related to monetary policy shocks), provides 
short run contemporaneous elasticities of investment with respect to interest rate through 
the user cost and through debt repayments taken into account in cash flow. 
Keywords: Investment, User Cost of Capital, Liquidity Constraints, Monetary Policy 
Shocks. 
JEL classification numbers: D92. 
 
Résumé: 
A l’aide d’un échantillon de 6946 bilans annuels d’entreprises industrielles françaises, cet 
article évalue les effets de ventes, du coût moyen pondéré du capital et de variables 
pouvant signaler des contraintes de liquidités (autofinancement ou trésorerie) sur 
l’investissement corporel de 1990 to 1999. L’élasticité estimée du stock de capital au coût 
moyen pondéré du capital est au plus égale à 0,26 en valeur absolue pour l’ensemble de 
l’échantillon. Pour ce qui est du canal du crédit, trois groupes d’entreprises représentant 
environ 20% de l’échantillon (entreprises présentant un score indiquant un risque de 
faillite élevé, entreprises appartenant au secteur des biens d’investissement, entreprises 
ayant un recours important aux dettes fournisseurs) ont des investissements plus sensibles 
à l’autofinancement. Lorsque la trésorerie remplace l’autofinancement, les entreprises 
risquées ont des investissements moins sensibles aux ventes. Pour différents groupes 
d’entreprises, les simulations des effets dynamiques d’un choc de taux d’intérêt 
(éventuellement associé à un choc de politique monétaire) fournissent les élasticités de 
court terme du capital au taux d’intérêt via le coût du capital ou via les charges d’intérêts à 
même de modifier l’autofinancement. 
 
Mots clés : Investissement, coût du capital, contraintes financières, choc de politique 
monétaire. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we complete the presentation and discussion of the estimated effects of 
monetary policy on French corporate investment reported in Chatelain et al. (2003) and in 
Chatelain and Tiomo (2002). We focus on the measurement of the impact of the cost of 
capital channel and the credit channel of monetary policy on investment. 
On the one hand, the available macroeconomic level evidence shows that the cost 
of capital channel of monetary policy has no or little effect on corporate investment in 
France. For instance, neither Amadeus (INSEE), nor Mosaïque (OFCE) nor the model 
developed by the Banque de France, three French forecasting models developed in the 
1990s, include the cost of capital effect on investment. INSEE's Metric model adds a 
relative factor cost whose parameter is small and not significant (see Assouline et al. 
[1998]). Herbet [2001] published a recent estimation of macroeconomic investment and 
recognised its failure to incorporate interest rate or user cost effects. 
On the other hand, some of the studies that have used sectoral-level data find large 
and significant investment elasticity to the user cost of capital. Using the BACH European 
database “aggregated by size and sector” based on Banque de France sample data for 
French data, Mojon Smets and Vermeulen (2001) obtained an elasticity for the user cost 
of -0.75. Duhautois (2001), who used data aggregated by sector and size from 1985 to 
1996 on the basis of the INSEE BIC-BRN, found a real interest rate elasticity of -0.38 for 
the period 1985-1990 and of -0.27 for the period 1991-6. However, Beaudu and Heckel 
(2001), who also used BACH, found a zero elasticity. 
Finally, Crépon and Gianella (2001), who used a sample of individual firm 
accounts (INSEE BIC database), obtained an user cost elasticity (UCE) of -0.63 for 
industry and of -0.35 for services for the two years 1990 and 1995. 
These studies show that we obtain a high user cost elasticity if (1) the sample 
period is short and/or (2) the cash flow or the growth of sales is omitted from the 
regression and/or (3) within estimates are used instead of dynamic panel data estimates, as 
in the generalised method of moments (Arrelano and Bond (1991)) and/or (4) when 
defining the user cost, the marginal cost of debt is approximated by an average cost of 
debt at the firm level instead of an average interest rate at the national level for all firms. 
Turning to the credit channel, several studies have indirectly addressed its 
relevance in France by testing the existence of liquidity constraints on individual firms’ 
investment. The main result is that financial variables (notably cash flow) affect the 
investment of groups of firms that are likely to be financially constrained (see Chatelain 
(2002)). Several studies have tested excess sensitivity of investment to liquidity variables, 
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such as cash flow, the stock of cash, leverage and the coverage ratio (see the references in 
Bond et al. (1997) and Hall, Mairesse, Mulkay (1999 and 2001)). 
Crépon and Rosenwald (2001) showed that the leverage parameter was lower for 
small firms during the years of sustained activity, i.e. 1988 and 1989 (their estimation 
period was 1986-1993). This means that the agency premium was lower for these firms at 
that time. The neo-classical demand for capital estimated by Beaudu and Heckel (2001) 
led to greater investment cash flow sensitivity for small firms during years of monetary 
restriction. In Duhautois (2001), leverage explains small firms’ investment from 1985 to 
1996 in a regression where sales growth is an omitted variable. Using Euler investment 
equations, where the cost of debt increases with leverage, Chatelain and Teurlai (2006) 
showed a cash flow misspecification (which is an indirect test of investment cash flow 
excess sensitivity consistent with the Lucas critique) for firms with a low dividend/payout 
ratio or a low investment/retained earnings ratio. Finally, Chatelain and Teurlai (2001) 
found that small firms with a high variation of debt and a high share of capital financed by 
leasing displayed an investment leverage excess sensitivity during the economic downturn 
between 1993 and 1996. 
The contribution of this paper is first to allow a greater precision in the estimation of 
user cost effects by building firm-specific measures of the user cost of capital and 
allowing for heterogeneity in the UCE across firms. Second, we are able to isolate three 
groups of firms for which investment is more sensitive to cash flow: firms facing a high 
risk of bankruptcy, firms belonging to the capital goods sector (which are more sensitive 
to business cycle fluctuations) and firms making extensive use of trade credit, a potential 
substitute for short-term bank credit. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In section 2, we provide an 
overview of the institutional and macroeconomic background to French corporate 
investment and financing in the 1990s. Section 3 shows how we obtain a greater precision 
of the user cost and the financial variable effects on investment, after isolating the 
heterogeneity in investment demand across different types of firms as precisely as 
possible. Section 4 compares the effects of a change in monetary policy on investment via 
the user cost and credit. Section 5 sums up the main conclusions. 
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2. Institutional and macroeconomic background 
 
Financial deregulation in France occurred in the mid-1980s. This led to 
considerable changes in the money and financial markets. Treasury bills took on greater 
importance, new financial instruments appeared on the scene, and new equity markets 
were set up (“second marché”). There were changes in the regulation of banks' activities. 
Quantitative credit regulation of banks by the central bank was stopped. All these reforms 
reduced both the control of the central bank on the quantity of credit supplied by banks 
and the dependence of non-financial corporations on banks. It is likely that they decreased 
the effect of the credit channel of monetary policy with respect to what it was before the 
mid-1980s.  
The depressed economic activity of the first half of the 1990s put on hold the 
development of financial innovations that had benefited small and medium-sized firms 
(SMEs). The 1993 recession led to a high number of failures, a large amount of bad loans 
for banks – many of which were triggered by the collapse of the corporate real estate 
bubble. In addition, the implementation of the capital adequacy ratios further limited 
banks’ willingness and ability to extend corporate loans. Finally, financial innovation that 
increased the scope of external finance instruments available to the corporate sector 
resumed after 1996. In particular, it is worth stressing that venture capital finance, 
promoted by government policies, grew sharply from 1996 to 2000. 
We now briefly review the macroeconomic developments of the 1990s. First, the 
share of corporate profit in value added, which had increased since 1983, consolidated at 
at historically high levels over the 1990s. This feature, combined with low demand owing 
to low-activity years and low investment, had a remarkable effect. The loss of sales 
affected aggregate profits far less than aggregate investment. Therefore, a high self-
financing ratio prevailed over the period except for the years 1998-2000. For instance, the 
aggregate retained earnings/investment ratio exceeded 100% for several years of the 
decade. A direct consequence of this flow of internal income and, perhaps, of “high” real 
interest rates for some firms in the early 1990s, was a decrease in leverage, and, in 
particular, of the share of bank debt in total liabilities. Conversely, this meant an increase 
of the share of equity. Furthermore, the fall in interest rates from 1995 to 1999 and the 
decrease of debt led to a decrease in aggregate debt repayments, which in turn further 
increased aggregate retained earnings. This decrease in the relative size of bank credit to 
firms may have affected banks' behaviour and their portfolios. 
Second, we note relatively high aggregate investment in the first year (1990) and 
the last years (1998 and 1999) of the sample period our study based on. Between these 
dates, low investment prevailed: low aggregate investment during the years 1991, 1992, 
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1996 and 1997, with slightly higher investment in 1994 and 1995, which followed an 
exceptionally low investment level during the 1993 recession. Monetary policy shifted 
from high nominal short-run interest rates from 1990 to 1993 to falling rates from 1994 to 
1999. This fall was anticipated on the bonds market, so that there was an inversion of the 
yield curve from 1991 to 1993. The high return from short-run debt caused some firms to 
delay investment and to accumulate cash during this period. 
 
3. Do some firms experience a tighter liquidity constraint? 
This section complements the results presented in Chatelain et al. (2003)4 by 
investigating the reasons why the introduction of cash flow or cash stock (cash in hand) 
drives the user cost elasticity down to zero.5 
First, we define the user cost as a linear function of a microeconomic average interest 
rate, which includes an agency premium. According to the broad credit channel theory 
(see Gertler and Hubbard [1988]), this agency premium decreases with respect to 
collateral, which depends on expected profits, which in turn are very much dependant on 
expected sales, among other factors (for example, Oliner and Rudebush [1996] state that 
the agency premium increases with the risk-free interest rate). Owing to the correlation 
between future profits and past profits, a potential explanation of the decline in the user 
cost elasticity, when cash flow is added to the regression, may lie in the joint correlation 
between cash flow, sales and the apparent interest rate (hence user cost). We may face a 
collinearity problem, which is not solved by the generalised method of moments (GMM). 
A second explanation relates to a heterogeneity bias and to the prevalence of self-
financing during the 1990s for some firms observed in the descriptive statistics, at both the 
macroeconomic and microeconomic level: some firms may depend much more on cash 
flow than others. In that case, the presence of such firms in the sample may lead to biases 
in the estimated coefficient and the standard error of the UCE (owing to an omitted 
dummy variable selecting these firms). This is what we investigate in this chapter. 
We found three sample-split criteria such that the long run investment cash flow excess 
sensitivity differential coefficient across the two groups of firms is significantly different 
                                                     
4 We use an auto-regressive distributed lag (ADL) model written in levels instead of in first 
differences as in Chatelain et al. (2003). The major difference is that the ADL in levels and its 
related error correction model have a “higher auto-regressive component” than the ADL in first 
difference. Consequently, the ADL in levels has a tendency to lead to higher long run estimates for 
other explanatory variables compared to the ADL in first differences. However, these differences 
are not always statistically significant in our sample (Chatelain and Tiomo (2002)). 
5 This result is robust to model and instrument selection using the generalised method of moments 
including optimal upward testing procedures (Andrews (1999), Chatelain (2007)). 
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from zero. A first set of statistical results on these sample splits is presented in table 1. 
Three sample splits, according to the level of trade credit in the firm’s liabilities, the level 
of credit risk of the firm and its sector appeared relevant. Furthermore, in contrast with 
other countries, sample separation with respect to size, the share of intangibles and the 
dividend pay out ratio did not yield relevant statistical and economics results. 
Estimates allowing for different coefficients across sub-samples defined along these 
three criteria are shown in table 2. First, we considered different coefficients for firms in 
the upper quartile with respect to the share of trade credit in total liabilities. Such firms are 
likely to experience difficulties in securing external finance. Investment cash flow 
sensitivity is 0.25 for firms with high trade credit-total liabilities ratios, whereas it is zero 
for other firms, which is consistent with the above interpretation. For all firms, sales 
growth elasticity is 0.43, but the user cost elasticity is not significantly different to zero. 
Second, we introduced a dummy variable relative to the capital goods sector, which is 
more sensitive to business cycle fluctuations than other sectors. Long run investment cash 
flow sensitivity is 0.42 for the capital goods sector, whereas it is only 0.07 for firms in 
other industrial sectors. Long run sales growth elasticity is 0.29. It is remarkable that the 
user cost is now significant for all firms with a long run elasticity of -0.26. 
Third, we separated firms on the basis of their Banque de France “score”, which is an 
evaluation of the credit risk of the firm. Risky firms, whose score function is below -0.3, 
present a long run investment cash-flow sensitivity of 0.24, whereas it is only 0.02 for 
other firms. This result was expected, as these firms experience more difficulties in getting 
access to external financing. Sales growth elasticity is now 0.65. Again, as for the 
regression allowing for a capital goods sector heterogeneity, the user cost elasticity is 
significant for all firms with a long run value of -0.21. 
Finally, we report the results obtained by using the risky firm dummies when the cash 
stock replaces the cash flow. For some authors, investment cash flow excess sensitivities 
are not valid measures of the financing constraint (see Kaplan and Zingales (1997)). Like 
the cash flow, the stock of cash held by the firm is an indicator of the firm’s ability to 
shield future investment from an expected tightening of borrowing conditions. However, 
the stock of cash may be less affected by the difficulty in interpreting investment cash 
flow sensitivity, as liquidity is less likely to be a proxy of expectations of future profits. 
The use of the stock of cash also alleviates risks of multi-collinearity in the estimation of 
the investment equation because it is less correlated with sales than cash flow. 
When the stock of cash replaces the cash flow in the investment regression and when 
dummy variables relative to company risk are added to the regression, the user cost 
elasticity also becomes significant, reaching a nearly unchanged estimate of -0.23 (see 
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Table 3). This is an additional robustness check for the user cost elasticity. The previous 
year’s cash stock is a significant determinant of current investment, as a proportion of the 
previous year’s cash may finance this year’s investment. However, unlike investment cash 
flow excess sensitivity, investment cash stock excess sensitivity is not significant for more 
risky firms. At the same time, risky firms’ elasticity of investment with respect to sales is 
significantly lower than that of other firms. This can either mean that the investment of 
risky firms reacts much less to sales than that of other firms, or that the test of the 
financial constraints in the investment equation is mis-specified. 
 
4. Monetary policy and investment 
The final step in our analysis is to connect investment to monetary policy actions. We 
do so starting from what we see as our most sensible results, that is the regression with the 
risk dummy variable. Following Chatelain et al. (2003), we focus on the time pattern and 
the lags in the reaction of investment to monetary policy shocks. We first consider the 
effect on investment of a permanent 1 per cent change in the market interest rate through 
the user cost (Table 4). The elasticity is now different to zero for France, but France still 
remains the country where the elasticity of investment with respect to the market interest 
rate is the lowest in the second year (Spain: -0,31; Germany: -0,38; Italy: -0,41; see Table 
7.11 in Chatelain et al. (2003)). 
Table 5 provides the yearly elasticity of contemporaneous investment with respect to 
cash flow for the group of risky firms (which represents 19 per cent of firms in our 
sample) and for the other group. In the case of risky firms, the elasticity of investment 
with respect to cash flow in France follows a similar path to that in Italy and Spain. Low 
risk French firms, in contrast, are quite similar to German ones (see Table 7.3 in Chatelain 
et al. (2003)). 
We then consider the effect of a permanent change in the market interest rate on 
cash flow. The higher firms’ interest payments, the lower their cash flow, ceteris paribus. 
Table 6 presents the effect on the growth rate of the capital stock (or investment) of a 
transitory 1 per cent increase in the interest rate through the cash flow. As in Table 5, the 
pattern for less risky French firms is close to the German pattern, while that for risky 
French firms is close to the Italian or Spanish patterns (cf. Table 10 in Chatelain et al. 
(2003)). These effects are, in general, relatively small in all countries. However, there is 
also an indirect effect of the market interest rate on sales and hence on cash flow, which is 
not evaluated here. 
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5. Conclusion 
We reach three major conclusions. First, by allowing heterogeneity across some groups 
of firms, we isolate more precisely firms which are more sensitive to cash flow than other 
firms and we improve the precision of the results presented in Chatelain et al. (2003) for 
France. The user cost elasticity with respect to investment is at the most 0.26 in absolute 
terms for all the firms of our sample. Unlike the recent papers which assess user cost 
effects at the firm level in France, this result is obtained using GMM estimates, which are 
the appropriate estimates for dynamic panel data. Our results thus confirms the direct 
effect of the interest rate channel on investment, operating through the cost of capital. 
 Second, we find three groups of firms for which investment is more sensitive to 
cash flow: firms facing a high risk of bankruptcy, firms belonging to the capital goods 
sector (which are more sensitive to business cycle fluctuations) and firms making 
extensive use of trade credit, a potential substitute for short-term bank credit. The rather 
high investment cash flow sensitivity of these firms (between 0.24 up and 0.42), which 
represent about 20% of our sample, confirms the existence of a broad credit channel 
operating through corporate investment in France. For other firms, investment cash flow 
sensitivity is close to zero. 
 Finally, among the four largest euro area countries, the effects of monetary policy 
on investment, operating through the cost of capital channel, are the lowest in France, 
while the effects of monetary policy on investment attributed to the credit channel in 
France were larger than in Germany but lower than in Italy and Spain over the last decade. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Various groups of firms  
            (Average values. Number of Observations: 61,237) 
 
  Number Main Variables 
  of Firms I(t)/K(t-1) ΔLogS(t) ΔLogUC(t) CF(t)/K(t-1) LogS(t) LogUC(t) 
 All sectors  6946 0.122 0.0296 -0.009 0.33 8.83 -1.77 
Sectors Food products 929 0.12 0.01 -0.014 0.27 9.3 -1.8 
 Intermediate 
products 
3371 0.11 0.04 -0.005 0.29 8.8 -1.7 
 Equipment 
goods 
1227 0.12 0.04 -0.008 0.37 8.7 -1.8 
 Consumption 
goods 
1286 0.15 0.01 -0.02 0.47 8.7 -1.8 
 Car industry 133 0.12 0.03 -0.02 0.31 9.8 -1.8 
          
Scoring  
Function 
No score 481 0.12 0.003 0.004 0.30 9.0 -1.8 
 Risky Firms 1293 0.12 0.03 -0.008 0.30 8.6 -1.8 
  Neutral Firms 1169 0.11 0.01 -0.007 0.28 8.5 -1.7 
  Riskness 
Firms 
4003 0.13 0.04 -0.01 0.36 8.9 -1.8 
          
Trade 
Credit 
< Q3 5910 0.13 0.06 -0.003 0.33 8.8 -1.8 
 > Q3 1736 0.12 0.02 -0.011 0.33 8.8 -1.8 
 
I/K: investment over capital; S: sales; CF/K: cash flow over capital; UC: user cost 
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Table 2: Auto-regressive distributed lags model with log(K) as endogenous variable. 
 
 Coeff. T-Stats Coeff. T-Stats Coeff. T-Stats 
Log K(t-1) 0.822 31.370 0.835 34.427 0.827 30.713 
Log K(t-2) -0.050 -5.670 -0.052 -6.206 -0.066 -5.339 
Log S(t) 0.075 2.788 0.041 1.743 0.091 3.210 
Log S(t-1) 0.023 0.826 0.022 0.944 0.064 2.697 
Log UC(t) -0.035 -1.306 -0.049 -3.019 -0.034 -1.824 
Log UC(t-1) 0.003 0.226 -0.007 -0.777 -0.016 -1.707 
CF(t)/K(t-1) 0.058 2.406 -0.004 -0.185 -0.015 -0.636 
CF(t-1)/K(t-2) -0.001 -0.033 0.018 2.025 0.019 2.147 
Differential coef. For: Low Trade Credit Equipment Goods Risky firms 
Log K(t-1) 0.003 0.195 0.026 0.901 -0.050 -0.689 
Log K(t-2) 0.000 0.598 0.001 0.717 0.086 1.542 
Log S(t) 0.004 0.919 0.004 0.411 0.014 0.401 
Log S(t-1) -0.004 -0.236 -0.008 -0.322 -0.046 -1.489 
Log UC(t) -0.011 -0.481 0.004 0.172 0.023 1.067 
Log UC(t-1) -0.002 -0.195 -0.001 -0.067 0.007 0.425 
CF(t)/K(t-1) -0.083 -3.413 0.082 3.260 0.077 2.328 
CF(t-1)/K(t-2) 0.026 1.392 -0.014 -0.903 -0.034 -2.114 
Long term eff. Sales 0.43*  0.29*  0.65*  
L.T. eff. User Cost -0.14  -0.26*  -0.21*  
L.T. eff. Cash-Flow 0.25*  0.07*  0.02*  
Differential coef. For: Low Trade Credit Equipment Goods Risky firms 
Long term eff. Sales 0.01  0.02  -0.04  
L.T. eff. User Cost -0.06  -0.02  0.11  
L.T. eff. Cash-Flow -0.25*  0.36*  0.22*  
AR2 -2.266 p = 0.023 -2.077 p = 0.038 -1.993 p = 0.046
Sargan 288.22 p = 0.088 275.48 p=0.204 300.91 p = 0.031
Instruments used in the regressions are all explanatory variables lagged 2 to 5. 
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Table 3: Auto-regressive distributed lags model with log(K) as endogenous variable and cash 
stock as liquidity variable: 
 Coeff. T-Stats 
 Less Risky Firms 
Log K(t-1) 0.785 36.2 
Log K(t-2) -0.053 -4.4 
Log S(t) 0.094 3.79 
Log S(t-1) 0.106 4.80 
Log UC(t) -0.053 -3.01 
Log UC(t-1) -0.011 -1.12 
Cash(t)/K(t-1) -0.007 -0.42 
Cash(t-1)/K(t-2) 0.041 2.93 
Differential coef. for: Risky Firms 
Log K(t-1) -0.033 -0.54 
Log K(t-2) 0.055 1.10 
Log S(t) 0.029 1.02 
Log S(t-1) -0.091 -3.38 
Log UC(t) 0.006 0.31 
Log UC(t-1) 0.011 0.67 
Cash(t)/K(t-1) 0.022 1.02 
Cash(t-1)/K(t-2) -0.021 -1.13 
 Less risky firms 
Long term eff. Sales 0.743*  
L.T. eff. User Cost -0.238*  
L.T. eff. Cash Stock 0.125*  
Differential coef. For: Risky Firms 
Long term eff. Sales -0.339*  
L.T. eff. User Cost n.s.  
L.T. eff. Cash Stock n.s.  
AR2 -1.694 p = 0.090 
Sargan 292.01 p = 0.066 
Instruments used in the regressions are all explanatory variables lagged 2 to 5. (n.s. : not 
significant). 
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Table 4. Contemporaneous elasticity of investment with respect to the market 
interest rate through the user cost 
 
T -0,16 
T+1 -0,23 
T+2 -0,20 
T+3 -0.18 
 
Table 5. Contemporaneous elasticity of investment with respect to cash flow 
 
Not risky (81%) - Risky (19%)
T 0.00                  0.19 
T+1 0.06                  0.33 
T+2 0.11                  0.44 
T+3 0.16                  0.53 
 
Table 6. Elasticity of investment with respect to the market interest rate through 
cash flow 
 
Not risky (81%) - Risky (19%)
T 0.00                   -0.05 
T+1 -0.02                   -0.09 
T+2 -0.03                   -0.12 
T+3 -0.04                   -0.15 
 
